Euthyphro Dilemma: Revisted

The Euthyphro Dilemma is specifically aimed as a refutation for the divine command theory. It does this through the introduction of several problems that occur in the dilemma. They are;

The Independence Problem
The Arbitrariness Problem
The Emptiness Problem
The Problem of Abhorrent Commands

Divine command theory can be roughly defined as the set of all moral truths are contingent on the commandments of God, or the will of God. That is, what God commands or wills to be morally good is what is morally good.

The Euthyphro Dilemma poses a serious challenge in that it raises the above problems and that divine command theorists have a difficult time responding to it, especially without giving up any power to God.

Some popular responses are to 'bite the bullet', appeal to human nature, or to differentiate God's nature.

'Biting the bullet' means to accept that the commandments or willings of God are indeed arbitrary, and that if God commanded us to commit murder then we are morally obligated to commit murder. This response is usually viewed as unacceptable and appalling, as to believe that murder or rape could be morally good is intuitively repulsive.

Appealing to human nature is a response saying that when God created us, he instilled into us what is right and wrong for us. So drinking a poison will be bad for us, while eating nourishing food is good for us. Since it is simply a part of our nature, God cannot, on a whim, change such things. They try to point out that God could have made us different, but since God didn't, this is the way things are. This response is completely unsatisfactory in that it doesn't remove the arbitrariness from his actions, they just claim he can't change what he has done [which also limits his omnipotence, but we'll ignore that this time]. It also doesn't address the nature of God in his decision making process and whether or not he is subject to moral implications of his own.

Differentiating the nature of God is pretty much done by placing what is morally good as an attribute of God. So God isn't subject to external morality, he has internalized morality and it therefore is in his very fiber to be morally good. This doesn't answer the problems either, because it appears as though God cannot change his nature nor act as he wishes. In addition it seems to be arbitrary that we select God as the standard for moral behavior, or as the source of moral behavior. wouldn't an entity have to behave according to some moral standards in order to be considered moral?

There are many other objections to the divine command theory and there are no satisfactory defenses of the theory.