Euthyphro Dilemma: The Problem of Abhorrent Commands

"Is what is good commanded by god because it is good, or is it good because it is commanded by god?"

The problem of abhorrent commands is a problem i laid out in my first writing on the euthyphro dilemma in that god is tyrannical. This problem stems directly from the arbitrariness problem. If what god commands is good, and there is no prior justification to any commandment, then all commands are equal and therefore whatever is commanded must be good. So, if god were to command us to rape children, then following the command would be laudable, since god's commands are good. This isn't what most people would want to admit that their god could be willing to do. No one wants to believe that the possibility exists where raping children would be acceptable. There are several responses that could be given to attempt to avoid this claim that anything is possible.

The first response is to claim that there are certain commands that god simply cannot give, that there is a constraint on the will of god the prohibits him from giving such commands. The problem is that this result back to the independence problem discussed earlier. If there is a constraint on his will then it appears as though there is something independent of god that places such a constraint. There is also the problem that it appears that there is a definition of good and bad prior to his commands, and is a direct refutation to divine command theory. It also appears as though if we were to take this route in saying that god has a constraint on his will, then it limits his omnipotence in that god could not command whatever he wills.

Another response, given by Robert Adams (in his The Virtue of Faith and Other Essays in Philosophical Theology), is that the divine command theory is contigently true on the condition that god is benevolent. (This is also known as the Modified Divine Command Theory http://www.iep.utm.edu/d/divine-c.htm#SH7b) I don't find that this actually solves any of the issues that the divine command theorist holds. Instead of saying that what is good is external to god, Adams has internalized goodness into the nature of god. But this still runs the issue of limiting his omnipotence in that god can not alter anything about what is good, and it is not his commands that are good but the revealing of himself that is good [a blow to the divine command theorist, not necessarily other theists, although the reduction to omnipotence does pose a problem to theists].

The last response is the bite the bullet response i have written out already. But to recap they admit that god can command anything at anytime and it is theoretically possible that god could command us to rape children and it would be laudable to do so. Which, as i said before, is unacceptable and is intuitively repulsive.