Euthyphro Dilemma: The Arbitrariness Problem

"Is what is good commanded by god because it is good, or is it good because it is commanded by god?"

The arbitrariness problem comes after the independence problem in that the divine commandment theorist has already decided that the first horn, that good exists independent of god, must be false. Therefore the second horn is the only possibility, in that what is good is good because god has commanded or willed it.

The problem is that accepting the second horn appears to render the content of the moral commands of god to be completely arbitrary. The reasoning is as follows:

-what is morally good is determined by the commands and willings of god.
-prior to any commandment of god the decision for such a commandment could not have been informed by any moral considerations, since prior to a commandment there is no moral law.
-if what is morally good is whatever is commanded by god to be good then they must be commanded by god prior to them being morally good.
-It must be that god has no prior moral considerations to base his commandments of morality on, therefore whatever god commands to be morally good is completely arbitrary.
-If there were moral facts that exist prior to god commanding them, then they would be independent of god and would not be dependent on the will of god. this outcome is already rejected by the divine commandment theorist.
-This means that whatever decision god makes about morality is equally as good as any other alternative that god could have chosen, since the decision is arbitrary.

One reply is that God's decisions are informed by other factors, such as if it maximizes utility [however utility should be defined] or that he does it for our well-being. But this doesn't escape the arbitrariness of the decisions made, since what is being considered as valid decision making criteria is still formed by the whim of God.