Tuesday, December 8, 2009
Friday, August 7, 2009
Watchmaker Analogy: Argument from Design
The watchmaker analogy was most famously formulated by William Paley. It is also called his teleological argument. The analogy attempts to demonstrate that since man-made objects are designed and have a certain complexity, that the complexity we see in the universe would entail design and therefore a designer.
So Paley argues that coming upon a stone in nature one would not think much of it, assuming it to have been there forever. But if one comes upon a watch on a beach one would instantly differentiate it from it's surrounding because it appears to have a specific design. Paley then concludes that "Every indication of contrivance, every manifestation of design, which existed in the watch, exists in the works of nature; with the difference, on the side of nature, of being greater or more, and that in a degree which exceeds all computation" (Natural Theology 1802, by Paley)
A problem arises from this in that if you instantly recognize that the watch is different because it appears to have been designed but then claim that the rest of nature also has been designed, then how is it that you are drawing the distinction of design between them? It appears as if this is a self-contradiction. The way we are able to draw the distinction between the watch and the beach is that we have prior knowledge of what a watch is because we have them in our culture.
Another problem arises from claims that the watch is complex and that is how we recognize it. This has been popularized in recent religious movements to attempt to modify the educational system to teach intelligent design as a science. The claim we recognize the watch because of its complexity is actually misleading. We recognize the watch because of its simplicity. A watch is far less complex than any living organism or ecosystem (or other things in nature, like crystal caves and even snowflakes). It is also the geometry of the watch that sticks out. The watch uses straight lines, arcs, etc. whereas these are rarely found in nature.
There is also a problem in that the complexity of artifacts does not entail the necessity of a designer. One of the claims of Paley is that there is a high amount of adaption in the plants and animals in the world. Paley believed that this level of complexity in the environment required an intelligent designer. Charles Darwin directly refuted this with his theory of natural selection. Darwin demonstrated that small amounts of change over time with a natural selection mechanism will lead to animals and plants being adapted to their environments. This will give the illusion of creation that they are fine tuned by a designer, but in reality they are fine tuned because if they aren't they will die and any descendant will die also.
Another problem is that the analogy is faulty. A watch is not made by a single person, there are multiple people that lead to its creation. There are miners, gem cutters, glass cutter, etc. If we are to actually use the analogy correctly, it is not that there is a designer, but multiple designers. So if nature is to be analogous to the watch, we would have to conclude that there is not one designer of the universe, but multiple designers of the universe. So the attempt to posit the designer as god would not be supported, but a polytheistic view would be more accurate.
There is still yet another problem, in that this line of argumentation does not just stop at a designer(s) of the universe. there would have to be a designer(s) of those designer(s). And there would have to be a designer(s) of those, and so on ad infinitum. Therefore you either fall into an infinite regress of designers designing other designers, or you arbitrarily stop it at a certain point.
So Paley argues that coming upon a stone in nature one would not think much of it, assuming it to have been there forever. But if one comes upon a watch on a beach one would instantly differentiate it from it's surrounding because it appears to have a specific design. Paley then concludes that "Every indication of contrivance, every manifestation of design, which existed in the watch, exists in the works of nature; with the difference, on the side of nature, of being greater or more, and that in a degree which exceeds all computation" (Natural Theology 1802, by Paley)
A problem arises from this in that if you instantly recognize that the watch is different because it appears to have been designed but then claim that the rest of nature also has been designed, then how is it that you are drawing the distinction of design between them? It appears as if this is a self-contradiction. The way we are able to draw the distinction between the watch and the beach is that we have prior knowledge of what a watch is because we have them in our culture.
Another problem arises from claims that the watch is complex and that is how we recognize it. This has been popularized in recent religious movements to attempt to modify the educational system to teach intelligent design as a science. The claim we recognize the watch because of its complexity is actually misleading. We recognize the watch because of its simplicity. A watch is far less complex than any living organism or ecosystem (or other things in nature, like crystal caves and even snowflakes). It is also the geometry of the watch that sticks out. The watch uses straight lines, arcs, etc. whereas these are rarely found in nature.
There is also a problem in that the complexity of artifacts does not entail the necessity of a designer. One of the claims of Paley is that there is a high amount of adaption in the plants and animals in the world. Paley believed that this level of complexity in the environment required an intelligent designer. Charles Darwin directly refuted this with his theory of natural selection. Darwin demonstrated that small amounts of change over time with a natural selection mechanism will lead to animals and plants being adapted to their environments. This will give the illusion of creation that they are fine tuned by a designer, but in reality they are fine tuned because if they aren't they will die and any descendant will die also.
Another problem is that the analogy is faulty. A watch is not made by a single person, there are multiple people that lead to its creation. There are miners, gem cutters, glass cutter, etc. If we are to actually use the analogy correctly, it is not that there is a designer, but multiple designers. So if nature is to be analogous to the watch, we would have to conclude that there is not one designer of the universe, but multiple designers of the universe. So the attempt to posit the designer as god would not be supported, but a polytheistic view would be more accurate.
There is still yet another problem, in that this line of argumentation does not just stop at a designer(s) of the universe. there would have to be a designer(s) of those designer(s). And there would have to be a designer(s) of those, and so on ad infinitum. Therefore you either fall into an infinite regress of designers designing other designers, or you arbitrarily stop it at a certain point.
Wednesday, August 5, 2009
Euthyphro Dilemma: The Problem of Abhorrent Commands
"Is what is good commanded by god because it is good, or is it good because it is commanded by god?"
The problem of abhorrent commands is a problem i laid out in my first writing on the euthyphro dilemma in that god is tyrannical. This problem stems directly from the arbitrariness problem. If what god commands is good, and there is no prior justification to any commandment, then all commands are equal and therefore whatever is commanded must be good. So, if god were to command us to rape children, then following the command would be laudable, since god's commands are good. This isn't what most people would want to admit that their god could be willing to do. No one wants to believe that the possibility exists where raping children would be acceptable. There are several responses that could be given to attempt to avoid this claim that anything is possible.
The first response is to claim that there are certain commands that god simply cannot give, that there is a constraint on the will of god the prohibits him from giving such commands. The problem is that this result back to the independence problem discussed earlier. If there is a constraint on his will then it appears as though there is something independent of god that places such a constraint. There is also the problem that it appears that there is a definition of good and bad prior to his commands, and is a direct refutation to divine command theory. It also appears as though if we were to take this route in saying that god has a constraint on his will, then it limits his omnipotence in that god could not command whatever he wills.
Another response, given by Robert Adams (in his The Virtue of Faith and Other Essays in Philosophical Theology), is that the divine command theory is contigently true on the condition that god is benevolent. (This is also known as the Modified Divine Command Theory http://www.iep.utm.edu/d/divine-c.htm#SH7b) I don't find that this actually solves any of the issues that the divine command theorist holds. Instead of saying that what is good is external to god, Adams has internalized goodness into the nature of god. But this still runs the issue of limiting his omnipotence in that god can not alter anything about what is good, and it is not his commands that are good but the revealing of himself that is good [a blow to the divine command theorist, not necessarily other theists, although the reduction to omnipotence does pose a problem to theists].
The last response is the bite the bullet response i have written out already. But to recap they admit that god can command anything at anytime and it is theoretically possible that god could command us to rape children and it would be laudable to do so. Which, as i said before, is unacceptable and is intuitively repulsive.
The problem of abhorrent commands is a problem i laid out in my first writing on the euthyphro dilemma in that god is tyrannical. This problem stems directly from the arbitrariness problem. If what god commands is good, and there is no prior justification to any commandment, then all commands are equal and therefore whatever is commanded must be good. So, if god were to command us to rape children, then following the command would be laudable, since god's commands are good. This isn't what most people would want to admit that their god could be willing to do. No one wants to believe that the possibility exists where raping children would be acceptable. There are several responses that could be given to attempt to avoid this claim that anything is possible.
The first response is to claim that there are certain commands that god simply cannot give, that there is a constraint on the will of god the prohibits him from giving such commands. The problem is that this result back to the independence problem discussed earlier. If there is a constraint on his will then it appears as though there is something independent of god that places such a constraint. There is also the problem that it appears that there is a definition of good and bad prior to his commands, and is a direct refutation to divine command theory. It also appears as though if we were to take this route in saying that god has a constraint on his will, then it limits his omnipotence in that god could not command whatever he wills.
Another response, given by Robert Adams (in his The Virtue of Faith and Other Essays in Philosophical Theology), is that the divine command theory is contigently true on the condition that god is benevolent. (This is also known as the Modified Divine Command Theory http://www.iep.utm.edu/d/divine-c.htm#SH7b) I don't find that this actually solves any of the issues that the divine command theorist holds. Instead of saying that what is good is external to god, Adams has internalized goodness into the nature of god. But this still runs the issue of limiting his omnipotence in that god can not alter anything about what is good, and it is not his commands that are good but the revealing of himself that is good [a blow to the divine command theorist, not necessarily other theists, although the reduction to omnipotence does pose a problem to theists].
The last response is the bite the bullet response i have written out already. But to recap they admit that god can command anything at anytime and it is theoretically possible that god could command us to rape children and it would be laudable to do so. Which, as i said before, is unacceptable and is intuitively repulsive.
Euthyphro Dilemma: The Emptiness Problem
"Is what is good commanded by god because it is good, or is it good because it is commanded by god?"
The emptiness problem stems from the second horn of the dilemma. The divine command theorist is commited to saying that what God commands is good. They are also commited to saying that God is good. This makes is appear as if what is reall being said is an empty tautology. If what is good is what god commands then in order for god to be good all he has to do is to follow his own commands, or that in order for god to be good he has to not do anything he forbids himself to do. It may be true, but the meaning is empty.
One type of response to this is to deny that the tautology is empty or insignificant. An example that has been given is to say that water and H2O is a tautology and is scientifically significant. They might claim that this means that the tautology about god would therefore be significant. The problem with this is that water and H2O are similar, but are not true synonyms (as there are no synonyms in the english language). You simply cannot say something significant all the time by changing H2O with water. For example, it has some meaning to say that H2O is the chemical symbols for water. If water and H2O could be used interchangeably but keep the significance of a sentence then we could restate the above into: H2O is the chemical symbol for H2O, or water is the chemical symbol for water. There is something significant to say in the first sentence, but the following two sentences lost the meaning and became empty tautologies, such as what happens with god's actions being good because he doesn't forbid them.
Another response would be to deny that saying god is good is a tautology. If being good is to do as god wills/commands, then it might appear as if it could be false for god to do as he wills. There are many people that might will themselves to do something [like exercise more, stop smoking, etc] but don't end up doing so. It is therefore concievable that god could perform an action that does not follow his own will, and therefore we must reject that this is the root of his goodness.
This usually leads to another response in that it is claimed that god's goodness is of a different kind than human goodness, or that divine command theory only applies to human goodness. This seems to lead back to a previous problem in that there seems to be a criteria for goodness for god that is independent of his will or commandments. It appears as if god is subject, once again, to a definition of goodness that is independent of his will and commands. If something else defines god's goodness, we still cannot be sure that what is good follow from his subjugation of goodness for himself, and can still draw that the possibility remains that what he commands of wills could be arbitrary in addition to goodness being independent of him (which the divine command theorist does not want to claim).
The emptiness problem stems from the second horn of the dilemma. The divine command theorist is commited to saying that what God commands is good. They are also commited to saying that God is good. This makes is appear as if what is reall being said is an empty tautology. If what is good is what god commands then in order for god to be good all he has to do is to follow his own commands, or that in order for god to be good he has to not do anything he forbids himself to do. It may be true, but the meaning is empty.
One type of response to this is to deny that the tautology is empty or insignificant. An example that has been given is to say that water and H2O is a tautology and is scientifically significant. They might claim that this means that the tautology about god would therefore be significant. The problem with this is that water and H2O are similar, but are not true synonyms (as there are no synonyms in the english language). You simply cannot say something significant all the time by changing H2O with water. For example, it has some meaning to say that H2O is the chemical symbols for water. If water and H2O could be used interchangeably but keep the significance of a sentence then we could restate the above into: H2O is the chemical symbol for H2O, or water is the chemical symbol for water. There is something significant to say in the first sentence, but the following two sentences lost the meaning and became empty tautologies, such as what happens with god's actions being good because he doesn't forbid them.
Another response would be to deny that saying god is good is a tautology. If being good is to do as god wills/commands, then it might appear as if it could be false for god to do as he wills. There are many people that might will themselves to do something [like exercise more, stop smoking, etc] but don't end up doing so. It is therefore concievable that god could perform an action that does not follow his own will, and therefore we must reject that this is the root of his goodness.
This usually leads to another response in that it is claimed that god's goodness is of a different kind than human goodness, or that divine command theory only applies to human goodness. This seems to lead back to a previous problem in that there seems to be a criteria for goodness for god that is independent of his will or commandments. It appears as if god is subject, once again, to a definition of goodness that is independent of his will and commands. If something else defines god's goodness, we still cannot be sure that what is good follow from his subjugation of goodness for himself, and can still draw that the possibility remains that what he commands of wills could be arbitrary in addition to goodness being independent of him (which the divine command theorist does not want to claim).
Euthyphro Dilemma: The Arbitrariness Problem
"Is what is good commanded by god because it is good, or is it good because it is commanded by god?"
The arbitrariness problem comes after the independence problem in that the divine commandment theorist has already decided that the first horn, that good exists independent of god, must be false. Therefore the second horn is the only possibility, in that what is good is good because god has commanded or willed it.
The problem is that accepting the second horn appears to render the content of the moral commands of god to be completely arbitrary. The reasoning is as follows:
-what is morally good is determined by the commands and willings of god.
-prior to any commandment of god the decision for such a commandment could not have been informed by any moral considerations, since prior to a commandment there is no moral law.
-if what is morally good is whatever is commanded by god to be good then they must be commanded by god prior to them being morally good.
-It must be that god has no prior moral considerations to base his commandments of morality on, therefore whatever god commands to be morally good is completely arbitrary.
-If there were moral facts that exist prior to god commanding them, then they would be independent of god and would not be dependent on the will of god. this outcome is already rejected by the divine commandment theorist.
-This means that whatever decision god makes about morality is equally as good as any other alternative that god could have chosen, since the decision is arbitrary.
One reply is that God's decisions are informed by other factors, such as if it maximizes utility [however utility should be defined] or that he does it for our well-being. But this doesn't escape the arbitrariness of the decisions made, since what is being considered as valid decision making criteria is still formed by the whim of God.
The arbitrariness problem comes after the independence problem in that the divine commandment theorist has already decided that the first horn, that good exists independent of god, must be false. Therefore the second horn is the only possibility, in that what is good is good because god has commanded or willed it.
The problem is that accepting the second horn appears to render the content of the moral commands of god to be completely arbitrary. The reasoning is as follows:
-what is morally good is determined by the commands and willings of god.
-prior to any commandment of god the decision for such a commandment could not have been informed by any moral considerations, since prior to a commandment there is no moral law.
-if what is morally good is whatever is commanded by god to be good then they must be commanded by god prior to them being morally good.
-It must be that god has no prior moral considerations to base his commandments of morality on, therefore whatever god commands to be morally good is completely arbitrary.
-If there were moral facts that exist prior to god commanding them, then they would be independent of god and would not be dependent on the will of god. this outcome is already rejected by the divine commandment theorist.
-This means that whatever decision god makes about morality is equally as good as any other alternative that god could have chosen, since the decision is arbitrary.
One reply is that God's decisions are informed by other factors, such as if it maximizes utility [however utility should be defined] or that he does it for our well-being. But this doesn't escape the arbitrariness of the decisions made, since what is being considered as valid decision making criteria is still formed by the whim of God.
Tuesday, August 4, 2009
Euthyphro Dilemma: The Independence Problem
"Is what is good commanded by god because it is good, or is it good because it is commanded by god?"
The independence problem derived from the first horn of the dilemma: "Is what is good commanded by god because it is good?" If what is morally good exists prior to God commanding it to be morally good, then what is morally good is independent of God. This means that God is not the creator of moral goodness, but merely the discoverer of the moral good. If this is true, then God is not a necessary condition for their being morality. This also raises the possibility of morality being known independent of God, which is something the divine command theorist does not wish to admit.
The conclusion that God isn't the source of morality or that morality exists independently of God leads the divine command theorist to the second horn, that what is good is good because it is commanded by god.
The independence problem derived from the first horn of the dilemma: "Is what is good commanded by god because it is good?" If what is morally good exists prior to God commanding it to be morally good, then what is morally good is independent of God. This means that God is not the creator of moral goodness, but merely the discoverer of the moral good. If this is true, then God is not a necessary condition for their being morality. This also raises the possibility of morality being known independent of God, which is something the divine command theorist does not wish to admit.
The conclusion that God isn't the source of morality or that morality exists independently of God leads the divine command theorist to the second horn, that what is good is good because it is commanded by god.
Euthyphro Dilemma: Revisted
The Euthyphro Dilemma is specifically aimed as a refutation for the divine command theory. It does this through the introduction of several problems that occur in the dilemma. They are;
The Independence Problem
The Arbitrariness Problem
The Emptiness Problem
The Problem of Abhorrent Commands
Divine command theory can be roughly defined as the set of all moral truths are contingent on the commandments of God, or the will of God. That is, what God commands or wills to be morally good is what is morally good.
The Euthyphro Dilemma poses a serious challenge in that it raises the above problems and that divine command theorists have a difficult time responding to it, especially without giving up any power to God.
Some popular responses are to 'bite the bullet', appeal to human nature, or to differentiate God's nature.
'Biting the bullet' means to accept that the commandments or willings of God are indeed arbitrary, and that if God commanded us to commit murder then we are morally obligated to commit murder. This response is usually viewed as unacceptable and appalling, as to believe that murder or rape could be morally good is intuitively repulsive.
Appealing to human nature is a response saying that when God created us, he instilled into us what is right and wrong for us. So drinking a poison will be bad for us, while eating nourishing food is good for us. Since it is simply a part of our nature, God cannot, on a whim, change such things. They try to point out that God could have made us different, but since God didn't, this is the way things are. This response is completely unsatisfactory in that it doesn't remove the arbitrariness from his actions, they just claim he can't change what he has done [which also limits his omnipotence, but we'll ignore that this time]. It also doesn't address the nature of God in his decision making process and whether or not he is subject to moral implications of his own.
Differentiating the nature of God is pretty much done by placing what is morally good as an attribute of God. So God isn't subject to external morality, he has internalized morality and it therefore is in his very fiber to be morally good. This doesn't answer the problems either, because it appears as though God cannot change his nature nor act as he wishes. In addition it seems to be arbitrary that we select God as the standard for moral behavior, or as the source of moral behavior. wouldn't an entity have to behave according to some moral standards in order to be considered moral?
There are many other objections to the divine command theory and there are no satisfactory defenses of the theory.
The Independence Problem
The Arbitrariness Problem
The Emptiness Problem
The Problem of Abhorrent Commands
Divine command theory can be roughly defined as the set of all moral truths are contingent on the commandments of God, or the will of God. That is, what God commands or wills to be morally good is what is morally good.
The Euthyphro Dilemma poses a serious challenge in that it raises the above problems and that divine command theorists have a difficult time responding to it, especially without giving up any power to God.
Some popular responses are to 'bite the bullet', appeal to human nature, or to differentiate God's nature.
'Biting the bullet' means to accept that the commandments or willings of God are indeed arbitrary, and that if God commanded us to commit murder then we are morally obligated to commit murder. This response is usually viewed as unacceptable and appalling, as to believe that murder or rape could be morally good is intuitively repulsive.
Appealing to human nature is a response saying that when God created us, he instilled into us what is right and wrong for us. So drinking a poison will be bad for us, while eating nourishing food is good for us. Since it is simply a part of our nature, God cannot, on a whim, change such things. They try to point out that God could have made us different, but since God didn't, this is the way things are. This response is completely unsatisfactory in that it doesn't remove the arbitrariness from his actions, they just claim he can't change what he has done [which also limits his omnipotence, but we'll ignore that this time]. It also doesn't address the nature of God in his decision making process and whether or not he is subject to moral implications of his own.
Differentiating the nature of God is pretty much done by placing what is morally good as an attribute of God. So God isn't subject to external morality, he has internalized morality and it therefore is in his very fiber to be morally good. This doesn't answer the problems either, because it appears as though God cannot change his nature nor act as he wishes. In addition it seems to be arbitrary that we select God as the standard for moral behavior, or as the source of moral behavior. wouldn't an entity have to behave according to some moral standards in order to be considered moral?
There are many other objections to the divine command theory and there are no satisfactory defenses of the theory.
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